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1 Introduction
The demand for redistribution has complex motives that transcend self-
interest. The literature has shown that the belief that everyone has the right
to fully enjoy the fruits of her work leads to a lower support for progressiv-
ity. The effect of this principle, however, can be mitigated by the belief that
market competition generates unfair outcomes. If the opinion prevails that
one’s position on the social ladder mostly depends on luck or unworthy ac-
tivities such as free-riding and rent seeking, a society will demand a greater
redistribution to correct income disparities that do not reflect differences in
talent and effort (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005;
Bénabou and Tirole, 2006).
Following Alesina and Angeletos (2005) we assume that social injustice
can cause disutility according to a subjective sensitivity to fairness. The
aversion to unfair welfare allocations prompts an unselfish demand for redis-
tribution that contributes to determining the optimal tax rate of individuals
along with the selfish motives. In line with the previous studies, we first il-
lustrate how the desire to live in a fair society that rewards effort and talent
instead of luck and dishonesty leads individuals to unselfishly demand redis-
tribution. By extending the model used in Alesina and Angeletos (2005), we
then show that an increase in the individual aversion to unfairness prompts
opposing reactions in those with high and low incomes. The desire to live
in a fair society that rewards individual effort and hard work triggers an
unselfish although rational demand for redistribution and this then leads the
well off to prefer higher taxes and the poor to reject extreme progressivity.1
We provide evidence of these behaviors based on micro data collected
by the Bank of Italy in its Survey on Household Income and Wealth. This
survey includes information about people’s opinions and beliefs concerning
public spirit, taxation and redistribution. Following the literature on civic
capital and redistributive attitudes, we operationalize individuals’ sensitivity
to unfair allocations via indicators of the aversion to free-riding, one of the
unworthy activities that generates distributive injustice by enabling agents
to improve their position at the expense of society (see for example Alesina
and Angeletos, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Guiso et al., 2010; Algan et al.,
2016).
To provide consistent estimates despite the endogeneity issues related
to the study of individual preferences in a section of data, we use a proce-
1For the sake of readability, we will use the terms ’aversion to unfairness’ and ’sensitivity
to fairness’ as synonyms throughout the paper.
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dure proposed by Wooldridge (2002) that copes with the absence of external
identifying information by exploiting instruments derived from a nonlinear
first-stage. This strategy of identification is not as straightforward and trans-
parent as a random natural experiment. However, it is preferable to a sim-
ple OLS-based approach as it uses the same estimator as conventional IV
strategies, which is proved to be consistent; that is, given the validity of
instruments, the two procedures provide the same result in large samples
(Wooldridge, 2002). Even if this strategy does not hold a theory for ex-
plaining causality, it at least helps to correct the endogeneity bias of the
estimates.
Our empirical analysis shows that an increase in the aversion to unfair
allocations caused by free-riding is associated with opposing attitudes to-
wards redistribution depending on income: high income individuals, in fact,
tend to demand more redistribution despite knowing they will bear its cost
without enjoying the benefits, while those with low income tend to demand
less redistribution even if they would benefit from it without bearing its cost.
Our work bridges two strands of literature. The first examines how the
desire for fairness and beliefs in the equality of opportunities influence indi-
vidual preferences for redistribution (Piketty, 1995; Alesina and Angeletos,
2005; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Bénabou and Tirole, 2006; Dahlberg
et al., 2012; Gualtieri et al., 2017). The second strand investigates how tax
morale and the demand for redistribution are affected by various dimensions
of social capital such as trust (Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013; Bergh and
Bjørnskov, 2014; Daniele and Geys, 2015), civic-mindedness (Algan et al.,
2016; Cerqueti et al., 2016), social participation (Sabatini, 2008; Yamamura,
2012; Andriani, 2016) and culture (Alm and Torgler, 2006; Guiso et al.,
2006).
We add to these studies by showing that a stronger aspiration to live
in a fair society can induce opposing and counter-intuitive changes in the
demand for redistribution depending on the individual’s position on the in-
come ladder. To the best of our knowledge, these relationships have not been
previously theorized and tested in the literature Our results also add to the
social capital literature by extending our knowledge of the possible economic
consequences of civic-mindedness, addressed by numerous studies after the
seminal work of Putnam et al. (1993).
The paper proceeds as follows: section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 describes the data, the empirical strategy and the results of
our empirical analysis. Section 4 draws some concluding remarks.
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2 Theoretical framework
We use a simplified version of the set up developed by Alesina and Angeletos
(2005) to analyze how the aversion to unfair welfare allocations affects the
individual demand for redistribution.
Let us assume a continuum of agents indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The individual
income of agent i is
yi = Ai + ηi,
where yi is the income of agent i, Ai summarizes agent i’s individual features,
such as talent and effort, and ηi is a zero-mean i.i.d. shock to the individual
income. This can be interpreted either as random luck or as the outcome of
unworthy activities such as corruption and free-riding. Agents live for one
period and consume their whole income. We assume that individual features
and unworthy activities are uncorrelated, so that Cov(Ai, ηi) = 0.
Following Meltzer and Richard (1981), the public sector implements a
redistributive scheme where incomes are taxed at rate t, and tax revenues
are redistributed evenly among agents. Accordingly, disposable income is
given by
ci = (1− t)yi +G, (1)
where G = ty, and y =
´ 1
0 yidi.
Individual preferences are given by
Ui = ci − ωiΩ,
where Ω measures the disutility caused by social allocations perceived as
’unfair’. The parameter ωi can be interpreted as the individual aversion to
’unfairness’. A social allocation is unfair when it deviates from what agents
should get based on their individual talent and effort yˆi = Ai; in line with
Alesina and Angeletos (2005) we assume
Ω =
ˆ 1
0
(ci − yˆi)2 di.
Given (1), the definition of G, and Cov(Ai, ηi) = 0, after some manipu-
lation we find
Ω = (1− t)2ση + t2σA,
where ση ≡ V ar(η) and σA ≡ V ar(A).
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The desired individual tax rate maximizes the agent’s expected utility
E[Ui] = E(ci)− ωiΩ = (1− t)Ai + ty − ωi
(
(1− t)2ση + t2σA
)
. (2)
The tax rate affects individual expected utility in two ways. First, it deter-
mines the expected disposable income. Agents gain from a positive tax rate
as long as their expected income is less than the mean income: this is the
’selfish’ motive for desiring redistribution. Expected disposable income is
maximized by t = 1 when Ai < y, and by t = 0 otherwise. Second, individu-
als who care about social outcomes may desire a positive tax rate to reduce
the ’unfairness’ of the market allocation. Furthermore Ω is minimized by
tΩ = ση/(ση + σA), which is an increasing function of ση. To reduce unfair-
ness, agents demand redistribution as long as it reduces the component of
outcomes variability dependent on luck or free-riding. In contrast, a higher
σA, by contrast, reduces the desired tax rate as agents do not want to reduce
income dispersion when it is due to talent or effort.
The optimal individual tax rate t∗ balances the ’selfish’ and ’fairness’
motives for redistribution. By maximizing (2) with respect to t, t∗ can be
readily found as
t∗ =
y −Ai + 2ωiση
2ωi(ση + σA)
. (3)
Agents will demand positive redistribution, t∗ > 0, if y−Ai+ 2ωiση > 0.
There will always be a positive demand for redistribution arising from the
aversion to unfair outcomes, as long as there is a possibility of free-riding
(ση > 0). However, a selfish demand for redistribution is positive only for
agents with below-average expected income (Ai < y). Agents with an above
average expected income will demand redistribution if the fairness motive is
stronger than the selfish one; that is 2ωiση > Ai − y.
We are interested in assessing the relation between the desired tax rate
and aversion to unfair outcomes. We can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in the aversion to unfairness increases individ-
ual demand for redistribution if and only if Ai > y.
Proof. dt
∗
dωi
= Ai−y
2ω2i (ση+σA)
> 0 ⇔ Ai > y.
Relatively rich agents demand more redistribution the greater is their
aversion to unfair allocations. The opposite is true for agents with below
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average income. The aﬄuent have zero ’selfish’ demand for redistribution
while their demand for fairness yields the desired tax rate tΩ. The overall
desired tax rate t∗ is a (weighted) average of the two effects. When ωi
increases, agents attach a higher weight to the fairness motive so that t∗, by
moving closer to tΩ, increases. In contrast, selfish demand for redistribution
for relatively poor agents would require a 100% tax rate. An increase in ωi
increases the weight agents place on the fairness motive. Hence the overall
desired tax rate t∗ decreases because it moves closer to tΩ.
People with above average realized income lose from redistribution. Still,
their aversion to social outcomes they deem unfair makes them willing to
accept a certain amount of redistribution because they realize that unworthy
activities may undeservedly penalize some people. Therefore, an increase in
the individual sensitivity to fairness (an increase in ωi) will lead to a demand
for a higher tax rate. In contrast, ’poor’ agents gain from redistribution and
high taxes. However, a strengthening of the belief that people should get
what they deserve (again an increase in ωi), will lead them to restrain their
quest for redistribution from the rich and demand a lower tax rate.
3 Empirical evidence
To test the prediction established in Proposition 1, we use a two-stages least
squares (TSLS) approach, where the dependent variable is an indicator of in-
dividual support for redistribution and the main explanatory variable is the
individual sensitivity to fairness, ωi. In the second stage, ωi is instrumented
with the fitted probability from a nonlinear first-stage, which, despite not
relying on external information to identify the effect of ωi, provides consis-
tent estimates as explained in Wooldridge (2002). Our data and empirical
strategy are described in detail in the following subsections.
3.1 Data
Data are taken from the 2004 wave of the Survey on Household Income and
Wealth (SHIW), which is conducted every two years by the Bank of Italy.
The sample includes approximately 8,000 households and is representative
of the Italian population at the national and regional level. The sample was
drawn in two stages (municipalities and households), with the stratification
of the primary sampling units (municipalities) by region and demographic
size. Within each stratum, the municipalities in which interviews would be
conducted were selected to include all those with a population of more than
40,000 inhabitants (self-representing municipalities), while the smaller towns
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were selected on the basis of probability proportional to size. The individual
households to be interviewed were then selected randomly. In the 2004 wave
of the survey, a special section on “public spirit and taxation” was included
in the questionnaire, in which respondents were asked to give their opinions
about fairness and taxation.
The indicator of support for redistribution is built using the five point-
scale with respondents asked to respond to the following statements “The
more someone earns, the more (in percentage) he/she should contribute to
government spending” and “The Government should levy higher taxes on in-
come (personal and company) and lower taxes on consumption (VAT)”. The
point scale ranged from 1 (“Not at all”) to 5 (“Very much”). Our dependent
variable is the arithmetic mean of the two scores. Higher values measure a
stronger support for redistribution.
This indicator has often been used to measure the individuals’ support for
redistribution (e.g. Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005; Guiso et al., 2006; Algan
et al., 2016). Algan et al. (2016) model individuals’ support for redistribution
as the optimal ratio of consumption by low income individuals receiving
welfare benefits over the consumption of high income individuals funding the
welfare states with their taxes. In the empirical test of the model, the authors
measure support for redistribution through the score given by World Values
Survey (WVS) respondents to the following statements: “Incomes should be
made more equal” versus “We need larger income differences as incentives”.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) model the level of redistribution desired by
individuals as their optimal tax rate, decreasing in their current and future
expected income. In their empirical analysis, support for redistribution is
measured via the score given by General Social Survey respondents to the
statement: “Should the government reduce income differences between rich
and poor?”. Similar measures were used, for example, in the empirical works
of Corneo and Gruner (2002),Guiso et al. (2006), Luttmer and Singhal (2011)
and Dahlberg et al. (2012).
To measure individual sensitivity to unfair allocations, we use indicators
of the aversion to free-riding, which Alesina and Angeletos (2005) consider
one of the typical sources of unfairness in the distribution of income and
wealth. As explained in Guiso et al. (2010), judgments on free-riding fully
capture the individuals’ sensitivity to fairness: “The common features across
all these measure is that they are value judgments on activities that result
in the appropriation of (possibly limited) private benefits at the expense
of (possibly much larger) costs imposed on other members of society” (p.
17). In our empirical analysis, we use responses to the following questions:
“Which of the following situations do you think are always justifiable, never
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justifiable, or justifiable to some extent? Please give your answer on a scale
from 1 to 10, 1 being ’never justifiable’ and 10 ’always justifiable’: i) Not
paying for your ticket on public transport; ii) Keeping money you obtained
by accident when it would be possible to return it to the rightful owner
(for example, if you found a wallet with the owner’s name and address,
or if you were given too much change at the supermarket check-out); and
iii) Not leaving your name for the owner of a car you accidentally scraped
while parking.” Given the wording of this questions, lower values capture a
greater aversion to unfairness. Our indicator of the aversion to unfairness
is the arithmetic mean of the (inverted) scores given by respondents to the
three statements.
As in Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) and Algan et al. (2016) this indicator
is appropriate for testing the relationships described in Proposition 1 in that
it enables us to detect how support for the redistribution varies in relation
to changes in the individuals’ sensitivity to unfair allocations, i.e. driven by
the appropriation of private benefits at the expenses of others.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1. Income distribution is
asymmetric and positively skewed (it has a long right tail), as the median
value is lower than the mean. This is consistent with the empirical distri-
bution of national households’ income, as reported by the official statistics
for Italy (see Istat, 2008). Regarding the preference for redistribution, its
distribution is roughly symmetric. The mean value of 3.8 indicates a high
preference for redistribution in the sample.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Mean St. Dev.
Preference for redistribution 3.839 0.908
Sensitivity to fairness 8.762 1.819
Age 50.60 20.51
Income 33.40 29.98
Gender 0.470 0.499
Married 0.589 0.492
Single 0.244 0.430
Separated 0.0379 0.191
Primary school 0.259 0.438
Middle school 0.266 0.442
Vocational secondary school 0.0578 0.233
High school 0.223 0.416
University diploma 0.00816 0.0900
Bachelor degree 0.0741 0.262
Postgraduate 0.00241 0.0491
Employee 0.328 0.470
Self-employed 0.0823 0.275
Unemployed 0.0545 0.227
Observations 8703
Income: 1st quartile: 18.20, Median: 27.79, 3rd quartile: 40.91
3.2 Empirical strategy
The study of individual behaviors and beliefs in a section of survey data
entails relevant endogeneity problems. Sensitivity to unfairness and an in-
dividual support for redistribution may both be driven by common latent
features of individuals such as unobservable attitudes and abilities. However,
it was not possible to find appropriate instruments in the survey data, nor to
retrieve the conditions for a natural experiment for us to identify the effect
of the aversion to unfairness on the individual demand for redistribution.
To obtain consistent estimates despite these issues, we followed procedure
18.1 in Wooldridge (2002), known as probit-TSLS (Cerulli, 2004), which
consists of three steps:
1. Estimate an ordered probit model regressing ω on the covariates x.
Let us denote the latent individual aversion to unfairness as ω∗ taking
values in (-∞;∞). The observable variable we use to measure ω∗ is
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ω, which takes J − 1 = 10 possible values. The latent variable can be
modeled as:
ω∗ = β′x+ ε
We observe ω = j if τj−1 ≤ ω∗ ≤ τj , for j = 1, ..., J−1, and we assume
τ0 = −∞ and τj = ∞. Thus the probability of τj−1 ≤ ω∗ ≤ τj is
equal to the probability of ω = j and can be modeled as:
P (ω = j|x) = Φ (τj − β′x)− Φ (τj−1 − β′x)
Where Φ () is the cumulative normal density function of ε. The cut
points τj and the coefficient vector β can be estimated by maximum
likelihood.
2. Work out the fitted probabilities of the ordered probit model, Pˆ , as:
Pˆ (ω = j|x) = Φ
(
τˆj − βˆ′x
)
− Φ
(
τˆj−1 − βˆ′x
)
(4)
3. Carry out a linear TSLS of the preference for redistribution on ω and
x, using Pˆi as instrument. That is:
redistribution = γ′x+ λω + u (5)
Where a consistent estimate of λ is obtained as:
ˆλ =
cov
(
redistribution, Pˆ
)
cov
(
ω, Pˆ
) (6)
The intuition underpinning this procedure lies in the fact that Pˆi is a non-
linear function of x, implying an imperfect correlation with it. However, it
is clearly correlated with ω, so that it can be used as an instrument. The
validity of the instrument is not affected by possible misspecification errors
made in point (1), namely in the specification of the ordered probit model.
Steps (1)-(3) are implemented in Stata by the ivtreatreg command
(Cerulli, 2004). The seminal work by Angrist (2001) showed that in cases
like the one under scrutiny, with a discrete dependent variable, the coeffi-
cients estimated with a linear TSLS are equal to the marginal effects obtained
by using more complex nonlinear instrumental variable models (e.g. biprobit
models). In the first-stage we use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) despite the
endogenous variable is discrete, because only OLS estimates can generate
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residuals that are uncorrelated with fitted values and covariates, thus pro-
viding a valid instrumental variable. The same does not hold, instead, for
nonlinear discrete models (see Angrist and Pishke, 2009).
We are aware that this identification strategy is not as straightforward
and transparent as the exploitation of a natural experiment. However, we
believe it is anyway preferable to a basic OLS approach because it uses
the same estimator employed in experiment-based IV strategies, which at
least has been proven to be consistent in large samples. Wooldridge (2002)
showed that, given the validity of instruments probit-TSLS and the more
conventional IV strategy provide the same result in large samples.
Once clarified the consistency of the estimates, two issues arise from the
theoretical model. First, the whole econometric procedure must be repeated
twice, once for the rich and once for the poor. Second, the model predicts
the existence of a threshold, or cutoff, in the distribution of income, entailing
that ∂t ∗ /∂ωi is positive for incomes above the threshold and negative for
incomes below the threshold. In the theoretical framework, the threshold
is modeled as the mean value of income. People around the mean income,
however, can hardly be aware of whether their income falls above or below the
threshold. They do not know whether they will benefit from redistribution
and they may not act according to our theoretical predictions because they
cannot properly formulate their selfish demand for redistribution.
To put the theoretical prediction into empirical testing, we then defined
the two categories of low and high income individuals as those agents whose
income respectively falls below the lowest quartile and above the highest
quartile of the income distribution. We then ran a series of robustness
checks testing other possible definitions of low and high incomes. Results
do not vary if we put in the low income group all those falling below the 75°
percentile.
Regarding the other quality checks, we picked two of the generated in-
struments in order to make the computation of the Sargan-J test feasible
without weakening the power of the test (Roodman, 2009). As reported in
Table 2, it is not possible to reject the null of validity of the instruments
at 10%. In addition, no significant differences are detected when the proce-
dure is estimated using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood, LIML,
which has the advantage of being less biased than TSLS in finite samples,
though less precise. Diagnostics of under-identification have also been per-
formed and it is not possible to accept the null of under-identification at the
conventional levels.
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3.3 Results
Table 2 reports the results based on different definitions of low and medium
incomes. We controlled for region fixed effects in all of the regressions.
Columns 1 and 2 report results when the 75th and the 25th percentiles are
used as cut-offs, that is, individuals above the 75th are considered as having a
high income (column 1) and those below the 25th are conventionally defined
as low income individuals (column 2).
Table 2: Sensitivity to fairness and preferences for redistribution
Cut-offs = 25th and 75th percentiles Cut-off = 75th percentile
High
income
(> 75%)
Low income
(< 25%)
Low income
(<75%)
Fairness 0.249***
(0.125)
-0.143*
(0.0818)
-0.213**
(0.0898)
Gender 0.0320
(0.0423)
-0.0343
(0.0462)
0.00154
(0.0263)
Age 0.003
(0.002)
0.00242
(0.00160)
0.00134
(0.00101)
Income -0.002***
(4.82e-07)
0.000506
(7.10e-06)
0.00453*
(2.59e-06)
Employee 0.150**
(0.0621)
0.0829
(0.0687)
-0.0512
(0.0397)
Self-employed -0.0774
(0.0749)
-0.177
(0.122)
-0.240***
(0.0583)
Unemployed 0.147
(0.146)
0.104
(0.0918)
-0.0752
(0.0639)
Constant 1.421
(1.201)
4.702***
(0.672)
5.457***
(0.777)
Observations 2,175 2,178 6528
F 0 0 0
P (Sargan-J) 0.690 0.589 0.350
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, p*** < 0,01. Income coefficient * 1000.
Additional controls: regional dummies, education, civil status.
Sensitivity to fairness is a significant predictor of support for redistribu-
tion. For incomes above the 75th percentile, fairness is positively associated
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with preferences for redistribution, while for those below the 25th percentile
fairness has a negative association, consistently with Proposition 1.
In a first robustness check, we used a different cut-off for splitting the
sample into low- and high-income groups. In this case, the well off are
still those above the third quartile-threshold, while all individuals below
the threshold are conventionally defined as having a low income. Results
(reported in column 3) still hold in the new specification, with the only
difference being a slight increase in the significance of the fairness coefficient.
Regarding the other covariates, income is a significant and negative pre-
dictor of the individual demand for redistribution of the aﬄuent. For those
in the lowest quartile, the coefficient of income is positive but not significant.
When we use the 75th percentile as cut-off, income also becomes significant
for those below the threshold, and its sign is still positive. This result could
be explained by the fact that low income individuals will likely continue to
gain from redistribution without bearing its costs even after limited increases
in their income (i.e. increases that are not high enough to enable a move
to a higher percentile of the distribution). These results are consistent with
the seminal work of Meltzer and Richard (1981), claiming that voters at the
median of the income distribution should vote for higher levels of taxes and
redistribution, and with previous empirical findings that, ceteris paribus,
richer people are more likely to demand less redistribution and lower taxes
(Corneo and Gruner, 2002, Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005 Powdthavee and
Oswald, 2014, Yamamura, 2014).
The coefficients of the work status dummies also offer interesting insights.
Self-employment is always negatively correlated to support for redistribution,
whichever cut-off is chosen for distinguishing high and low incomes. When we
use the 75th percentile as cut-off, the negative coefficient of self-employment
also becomes statistically significant. Self-employment has traditionally been
associated with greater economic individualism and concomitant resistance
to the welfare state (see among others the seminal work of Wilensky, 1975
and the empirical evidence in Torgler, 2003; Alesina and La Ferrara 2005;
Luttmer and Singhal, 2011; Guillaud, 2013). What is interesting in our em-
pirical findings is that self-employed in the first three quartiles of the income
ladder are also shown as being averse to redistribution. These individuals
may oppose redistributive policies because they rationally expect to move to
higher quartiles in the future, as suggested by Bénabou and Ok (2001).
Following Angrist (2001), we interpret the estimated coefficients with the
linear TSLS as marginal effects. The association between sensitivity to fair-
ness and preferences for redistribution has an economically relevant size that
counterbalances the ’selfish’ effect of income. In the baseline specification, a
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one-point strengthening of the sensitivity to fairness is associated with a 25
percentage points higher likelihood of supporting redistribution for the well
off and with a 14 percentage points lower likelihood for the poor. A unitary
increase in income (corresponding to €1,000) is significantly associated with
a 2 percentage points lower likelihood to support redistribution for relatively
rich agents.
When we use the 75th percentile as cut-off (column 3), the size of the
association between low income individuals’ sensitivity to fairness and their
support for redistribution becomes bigger and comparable in size to the
marginal effect of self-employment. A 1-point strengthening of sensitivity
to fairness is associated with a 21 percentage point higher likelihood of sup-
porting redistribution.
Overall, these results clearly illustrate how the aversion to unfair alloca-
tions is associated with unselfish attitudes towards redistribution: the well
off tend to demand more redistribution even if they will bear its cost without
enjoying its benefits, while individuals earning a low income tend to demand
less redistribution even if they will benefit from it without bearing its cost.
A further robustness check shows that the coefficient of ω takes on the
expected sign for every cut-off we chose for defining the low and high income
groups (whether it is the 25th, the 50th, or the 75th). Consistent with the
theoretical prediction, it is positive (negative) for those above (below) the
threshold and it is statistically significant from the third quartile2.
2A finer grid search has been performed by repeating the procedure every five per-
centiles between the second and the third quartile. The signs of the coefficients are stable
over all the iterations and we find statistical significance since the 70th percentile, with
no virtual differences in the estimates between it and the 75th.
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Table 3: Sensitivity to fairness and preferences for redistribution using LIML
Cut-offs = 25th and 75th percentiles Cut-off = 75th percentile
High
income
(> 75%)
Low income
(< 25%)
Low income
(<75%)
Fairness 0.252**
(0.127)
-0.144*
(0.0826)
-0.221**
(0.0929)
Gender 0.0320
(0.0424)
-0.0345
(0.0462)
0.00149
(0.0264)
Age 0.00309
(0.00196)
0.00242
(0.00160)
0.00135
(0.00101)
Income -0.00198***
(4.82e-07)
0.000579
(7.13e-06)
0.00470*
(2.65e-06)
Employee 0.150**
(0.0622)
0.0826
(0.0688)
-0.0526
(0.0401)
Self-employed -0.0772
(0.0750)
-0.177
(0.122)
-0.240***
(0.0586)
Unemployed 0.147
(0.147)
0.103
(0.0919)
-0.0770
(0.0645)
Constant 1.393
(1.223)
4.713***
(0.678)
5.520***
(0.804)
Observations 2,175 2,178 6,528
F 0 0 0
P (Sargan-J) 0.691 0.590 0.353
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*p < 0.1, **p < 0.05, p*** < 0,01. Income coefficient * 1000.
Additional controls: regional dummies, education, civil status.
To test the possible effect of small sample bias, we use the LIML esti-
mator as a correction mechanism in a robustness check. LIML has the same
large sample distribution as TSLS, but provides finite sample bias reduction.
Results obtained by using the 25th and the 75th percentiles as cut-offs for
low and high incomes are reported in Columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Column
3 reports coefficients for low income individuals when the 75th percentile is
used as cut-off. In all cases there is no significant difference in respect to the
TSLS estimates.
As further checks, we also controlled for: 1) The characteristics of re-
spondents’ area of residence (e.g. whether it is urban or rural). 2) The
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perceived economic well-being of the household, as measured on a six-point
scale with the question: “Is your household’s disposable income enough for
you to get through the month?”. Ceteris paribus, individuals experiencing
financial difficulties could be more favorable to welfare spending. 3) Re-
spondents’ time preferences, measured through responses to the question:
“If you had a windfall equal to your household’s net monthly income would
you spend the lot”, or “save a small part”, “save about half”, “save most of
it”, and “save the lot”. Low time preferences could be related to a stronger
willingness to pay higher taxes for having bigger public protection schemes
in return. In all cases, the results do not change and the coefficients of the
additional covariates are not statistically significant.
4 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the interplay between sensitivity to fairness and
the individual demand for redistribution. First, we theoretically illustrated
how the desire to live in a fair society where people’s income depends on
merit instead of luck can trigger an unselfish support for redistribution. An
increase in the aversion to unfairness can lead the aﬄuent to demand more
redistribution even if they will bear its cost without sharing its benefits, and
the poor to desire less redistribution thereby renouncing to the advantages
related to higher social spending.
We then found evidence of this behavior in a representative sample of
Italian taxpayers. The empirical analysis confirmed that an increase in the
aversion to unfair allocations is associated with opposing attitudes towards
redistribution depending on income. The size of the marginal effects is eco-
nomically relevant and overcomes that of income. Of course we do not intend
to establish any normative presumption equating fairness with support for
big governments and high welfare spending. Rather, we show that beliefs
about fairness can interact with income in determining the individual pref-
erences for redistribution in ways that were not previously theorized and
tested in the literature.
Even if we controlled for the bias of the estimates using the procedure
proposed by Wooldridge (2002), we lack a clear identification mechanism
standing from external information. This suggests caution in the interpreta-
tion of the coefficients. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence was shown to be
fully compatible with our theoretical reasoning and also revealed interesting
insights concerning, for example, the size of the influence exerted by the
selfish and unselfish motives for desiring redistribution. These results have
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relevant policy implications, as the share of people declaring support for re-
distribution has been found to be a strong predictor of welfare spending and
of the size of government (Alesina and Angeletos, 2005; Guiso et al. 2006).
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